The Presumption of Legitimacy: A Rebuttle Presumption by Shuford, Thomas
North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 2 Article 10
4-1-1973
The Presumption of Legitimacy: A Rebuttle
Presumption
Thomas Shuford
Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shuford, Thomas (1973) "The Presumption of Legitimacy: A Rebuttle Presumption," North Carolina Central Law Review: Vol. 4 : Iss. 2
, Article 10.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol4/iss2/10
298 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
powers, and "this Court has consistently deplored the encroachment of
other courts upon the legislative prerogative during the past decade."
While giving credence to the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court
does what the General Assembly declined to do.
The decision of Waddell may have taken from the North Carolina
jury the discretionary power to render life imprisonment or death in
capital cases of guilty verdicts, but this is no guarantee that the death
penalty will not be selectively imposed. There is still room for discrim-
ination. A jury, having the awareness that a defendant in a capital case
faces mandatory death if convicted, may be more reluctant to bring in a
guilty verdict. This reluctance may stem from the fact that a defendant is
black, white, rich, poor, or has red hair. Any punishment, death or other-
wise, will remain cruel and unusual until such punishment is applied
equally.
Several bills that would affect the death penalty have been proposed
for introduction into the 1973 General Assembly, which is presently in
session. The extent of these bills is not known at the present, but according
to news reports at least two proposals seek a mandatory death penalty and
at least one proposal opposes capital punishment. By the time this paper
is printed, the outcome of these bills will probably be known. Whatever
the legislature decides, the North Carolina Supreme Court will inevitably
be confronted with its new law. It will be interesting to see how the Court
will dissect the new law to conform to judicial specifications.
JOSEPH ADAMS
The Presumption of Legitimacy:
A Rebuttable Presumption
A child born in wedlock is presumed to be legitimate. According to
Professor Stansbury, "this presumption is one of the strongest known
to the law and it has been said that 'irresistible evidence' of the rebutting
circumstances is necessary to overcome it."' It is the purpose of this com-
ment to examine the various methods by which this presumption may be
rebutted, placing primary emphasis on blood grouping tests and North
Carolina law.
The original common law seems to have made the presumption con-
clusive. That is, no proof no matter how convincing could refute the pre-
sumption that a child born in wedlock was the husband's legitimate child.
1D. Stansbury, The North Carolina Law of Evidence, See. 246 (2d ed. 1963).
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The English common law later saw modification which permitted rebuttal
by proof that the husband "was impotent or was beyond the four seas
(that is, outside the jurisdiction of the King of England) during a period
that was deemed to make his fatherhood a biological impossibility."'
It is now clear that the presumption can be overcome, but the various
jurisdictions are not in accord on the methods and degree of proof neces-
sary to accomplish this. An early New York case declared the proof must
establish the absolute impossibility of paternity.8 A more recent Massa-
chusetts case held proof beyond a reasonable doubt was sufficient4 and
Alabama approved a "clear and conclusive test."5 Such tests continue to
be modified somewhat as new means to exclude paternity are recognized
by the courts and legislatures.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW
North Carolina has long recognized the presumption of legitimacy of
a child born in wedlock, and as previously noted according to Stansbury,
it is one of the strongest known to the law. However, as early as 1825 in
State v. Pettaway,6 North Carolina rejected the old common law rule
which made the presumption conclusive unless the husband was beyond
the four seas. That is, the presumption was deemed rebuttable by proof
that the husband could not have 'been the father as by showing that he was
impotent, or that he could not have had access to his wife during the period
of conception.
However, the court has strictly construed these tests and as late as
1941 in Ray v. Ray,7 held that evidence that the husband and wife did not
engage in sexual intercourse was insufficient if access was possible. Such
rulings are amply supported by prior holdings of North Carolina's
Supreme Court. For example, in State v. Green,' the defendant was
charged with abandonment and nonsupport of his minor child. His only
defense was that he was not the child's father, and he sought to introduce
evidence that despite the fact that he and his wife were living together,
they did not engage in sexual intercourse during the period of conception.
This and other evidence was excluded and on appeal to the Supreme Court
of North Carolina the Court asked, "When a child is born in wedlock,
2 128 A.L.R. 713 (1940).
8 Id. at 714.
Id. at 717.
'Id. at 718.
6 State v. Pettaway, 10 N.C. 623 (1825).
'Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217,13 S.E.2d 224 (1941).
' State v. Green, 210 N.C. 162, 185 S.E. 670 (1936).
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the husband and wife living in the same house, is legitimacy conclusively
presumed?"' The question was answered in the affirmative. The court
went on to say,
The ancient rule of the common law that if the husband was within the
four seas no proof of non-access was admissible has been modified in this
state only to the extent that the presumption may be rebutted by ev-
idence tending to show that the husband could not have had access or
was impotent.10
Despite such strong language it will be seen that the rule in this state
has been expanded, and although the courts sometimes refer to the pre-
sumption as "conclusive" even in recent decisions, such is not actually
the present state of the law.
According to State v. Herman" the presumption applies even when
the child is born within a month or day after the mother's marriage. How-
ever, the case pointed out that such antenuptial conception would make
the presumption more easily rebutted. Other cases make it clear that the
presumption also applies where conception took place during wedlock,
though the child was born after the marriage had been terminated by di-
vorce. However, if the child is born more than ten months after the death
of the alleged father there arises a rebuttable presumption that conception
had not taken place at the time of death.'" The law also presumes that chil-
dren may be born to a married couple as long as such marriage continues
regardless of the age of the parties. Stanley v. Foster13 cites the old com-
mon law rule that the possibility of issue is commensurate with life.
Although the courts recognize non-access as a valid rebuttal of the
presumption of legitimacy, they refuse to permit the husband or wife to
testify as to such non-access. "A 'husband or wife may not 'bastardize
the issue' by testifying to the husband's non-access during the period
when conception may have occurred."' 4 According to Stansbury the court
has kept this rule within narrow bounds. Therefore, it only applies when
paternity is directly in issue. It does not apply in divorce proceedings when
the issue of paternity is absent. At any rate, the spouses may still testify
to other facts bearing on the question of legitimacy. As State v. Pettaway'5
Old. at 163, 185 S.E. at 671.
10 Id.
1' State v. Herman, 35 N.C. 502 (1852).12 D. Stansbury, The North Carolina Law of Evidence, Sec. 246 (2d ed. 1963).
Stanley v. Foster, 244 N.C. 201, 92 S.E.2d 925 (1956).1, D. Stansbury, The North Carolina Law of Evidence, Sec. 61 (2d ed. 1963).
1 State v. Pettaway, 10 N.C. 623 (1825).
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pointed out the wife may be examined as to her criminal intercourse with
another -because "a fact so secret in its nature can scarcely ever be proved
by other evidence." Non-access may be proved by witnesses other than the
husband and wife and the fact that the wife is living in open adultery is
"a potent circumstance tending to show non-access." 16 The wife herself
may testify that a person other than her husband was the father of the
child according to State v. Bowman."7 Thus, despite the prohibition on
testimony concerning non-access by the husband or wife the issue of
legitimacy can be delved into by other means.
BLOOD TESTS AFFECTING THE PRESUMPTION
The almost exclusive tests of impotency and non-access were expanded
as early as 1877 when Warlick v. White" held that evidence that the hus-
band and wife were white while the child was of mixed blood would rebut
the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock. Much more im-
portantly North Carolina by statute in 1949 expanded the tests to include
blood-grouping tests which as will be seen can be utilized to overcome the
presumption.
Although the use of such blood tests to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy when there was access was until recently in doubt the follow-
ing case seems to put the matter at rest. The 1972 case of Wright v.
Wright 9 held that in both criminal and civil actions in which the issue
of paternity arises, the results of blood-grouping tests must be admitted
in evidence regardless of any presumptions of legitimacy, and such evidence
is competent to rebut the presumption. The case involved a wife seeking
alimony and child support. The husband-defendant denied he was the
father of the child in question and requested that blood-grouping tests be
made pursuant to G.S. 8-50.1,2o which reads,
In the trial of any criminal action.. . in which the question of paternity
arises, regardless of any presumptions with respect to paternity, the
court... upon motion of the defendant, shall direct and order that the
defendant, the mother and the child shall submit to a blood grouping
test.... Such evidence shall be competent to rebut any presumptions
of paternity.
In the trial of any civil action, the court ... upon motion of either
party shall direct and order . . . (blood-grouping tests).
Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217, 13 S.E.2d 224 (1941).
'
7 State v. Bowman, 231 N.C. 51, 55 S.E.2d 789 (1949).Warlick v. White, 76 N.C. 175 (1877).
19 Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972).
20 N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 8-50.1 (1949).
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Although the trial court issued an order for the test to be made, the Court
of Appeals reversed the order.2 The Court of Appeals cited a recent case,
Eubanks v. Eubanks,2" as a clear holding that such blood-grouping tests
could not be used to establish non-paternity if there was access. The Su-
preme Court refused to interpret the Eubanks decision in this manner. It
quoted the misleading language in Eubanks, i.e., "If there was access,
there is a conclusive presumption that the child was lawfully begotten in
wedlock." Then the Supreme Court stated,
Taken literally and out of context, the quoted statement would disallow
evidence even of impotency or physical or racial differences to rebut
the presumption. However, the topic sentence of the paragraph (in
Eulbanks) ... demonstrates the real rationale of the rule: 'When a child
is born in wedlock, the law presumes it to be legitimate, and this pre-
sumption can be rebutted only by facts and circumstances which show
that the husband could not have been the father, as that he was impotent
or could not have had access .... 24
The court went on to explain that non-access and impotency were cited
in the above statement only as examples of the kind of evidence that
would show that the husband was not the father. There was nothing to
prevent blood-grouping tests from being such evidence. The court con-
tinued:
Although we continue to recognize (the presumption) ... this presump-
tion must give way before dependable evidence to the contrary. Blood-
grouping tests which show that a man cannot be the father of a child
are perhaps the most dependable evidence we have known.25
The Court of Appeals decision as to the order for blood-grouping tests
was reversed, and G.S. 8-50.1 was held to authorize such tests even when
there was access.
Although such evidence is admissible it is not conclusive. In State v.
Fowler,26 the court held that even when a blood-grouping test demon-
strates non-paternity "our law does not make the test conclusive of that
issue." Such tests are to be considered by the jury along with all the other
evidence on the question of paternity. The court points out that none of
"1Wright v. Wright, 11 N.C. App. 190, 180 S.E.2d, 369 (1971).
2 Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d, 562 (1968).
2 Id. at 197, 159 S.E.2d at 568.
"Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972).
25 Id. at 172, 188 S.E.2d at 325.
28 State v. Fowler, 277 N.C. 305, 177 S.E.2d 385 (1970).
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the relevant statutes requires the results of such tests to be conclusive.
Instead they merely direct that such evidence shall be admitted in evidence.
Thus, the defendant may find himself being convicted in a bastardy
prosecution or support proceeding even though the tests excluded him as
the father. Charlie Chaplin experienced such a result in Berry v. Chap-
uin,2 7 in 1946. There the California jury disregarded the excluding blood-
grouping test and found Chaplin the father of the child in question on the
basis of other evidence tending to show paternity. Such a result seems
difficult to justify especially in a time when scientific tests are thought by
many to be infallible. On the other hand, it must be conceded that such tests
depend on the skill and training of those who perform them. Mistakes can
be made, and the medical profession does not contend they are infallible
even when correctly administered. On the contrary, they admit that there
are theoretical exceptions of one in approximately 50,000 to 100,000
cases."' Recognizing that such possibility of error appears negligible when
compared to the reliability of other forms of evidence, it can nevertheless be
maintained that no evidence should be conclusive unless made so by statute.
It is a question many legislatures should consider.
The Fowler case referred to previously was based on facts differing
greatly from Berry v. Chaplin. Here the defendant in a bastardy prosecu-
tion requested the tests pursuant to the statutes, but such was impossible
in that the child had died. Defendant then asked for dismissal of the action
contending that since no tests could be made it would constitute a denial
of due process to continue the prosecution. The court was not convinced
and ruled against the defendant. Justice Sharp writing for the court re-
ferred to the relevant statutes which clearly do not make the results of
such tests conclusive. Dismissal of the prosecution was not warranted even
though defendant did have a "substantial right" to such tests and such
must be ordered when possible. Due to the death of the child, the tests were
impossible and defendant could not complain.
Blood-grouping tests are often an invaluable aid to the innocent de-
fendant, but their benefit is limited. They can never prove paternity. The
test might show the defendant or someone else to have a blood type which
the father of the child must have had, "but this only indicates that of all
the people of that blood type or group, he, as well as anyone else with that
blood type or group, could have been the father ... ."" Nevertheless, it
Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946).
'8 State v. Fowler, 277 N.C. 305, 177 S.E.2d 385 (1970).
29Id. at 308, 177 S.E.2d at 387.
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has been estimated that by such tests a defendant falsely accused of father-
ing a child "has a 50-55% chance of proving his non-paternity."3
CONCLUSION
The presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is clearly not
conclusive. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence of non-access,
impotency, racial differences, and excluding blood-grouping tests. North
Carolina simply states that such evidence must show that defendant could
not be the father, and it is entirely possible that new methods of proving
this will be recognized in the future. One hopes that the legislature will
take a new look at the weight to be given blood-grouping tests results.
While a conclusive presumption is unwarranted due to the possibility of
human error in administering such tests, it, nevertheless, appears that the
results should be entitled to more weight than merely 'being considered
along with all the other evidence. It is conceivable that a jury upon hearing
evidence of illicit sexual intercourse might find against the defendant
even though the blood tests convince them that he is not the father. That is,
they may decide to punish him for the illicit sexual activity regardless of
his paternity or nonpaternity of the child. Although some may consider
this justice, such a result is clearly contrary to the statutes and beyond the
province of the jury. It would seem that excluding blood tests should at
least create a rebuttable presumption that the defendant is not the father.
Such a rule would leave the tests open to attack as to the quality and skill
of those administering the tests. At any rate this is an issue that the legis-
lature should face, hopefully in the near future.
THOMAS SHUFORD
Prepaid Legal Services: An Overview
People in middle income brackets usually spend a substantial portion
of their incomes on various types of insurance. This is done for the pur-
pose of avoiding the full financial impact occasioned by major losses or
personal injury. To accomplish this goal of adequate coverage, insurance
must broaden its reach to all areas in which major costs could foreseeably
occur. While various plans are widely available in the areas of accident,
fire, and health insurance, there are very few such systems designed to
insure against the costs of legal services. Any void in the insurance field is
80Id.
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